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The perils of privacy and intelligence-sharing
arrangements: the Australia–Israel case study
Dr Daniel Baldino and Kate Grayson
The aim of this analysis is to explore the governance
frameworks and associated privacy and interrelated risks
that stem from bilateral security arrangements such as
the Australia–Israel intelligence relationship. In an era of
expanding globalisation of intelligence, targeted oversight advances that are adaptive to global trends may
serve to mitigate the potential costs and downsides of
transnational intelligence exchange while respecting the
privacy, rights and liberties of citizens and ensuring that
sovereignty, human rights standards and rule of law
remain protected.

Introduction
The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is the principal piece of
Australian legislation for protecting the handling of
personal information about individuals including the
collection, use, storage and disclosure of personal information in both the federal public sector and in the
private sector.1 Whilst the Australian National Intelligence Community (NIC) agencies are subject to privacy
requirements that are informed by the principles that
underpin the Privacy Act, the Privacy Act itself does not
cover all of the Australian intelligence and national
security agencies.2 These include the Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Australian
Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS).
This matter is particularly pertinent given that spycraft is an international endeavour and remains an
exceedingly secretive (and often misunderstood) arena.
Certainly, Australia’s bilateral intelligence liaisons with
both traditional and non-traditional foreign counterparts
have amplified post 9/11. But enhanced intelligence
cooperation is not a cost-free exercise and can create
diplomatic and political quandaries that expose a “darker
side”. Thus information-sharing advantages in a digital
age will continue to co-exist with latent political pitfalls,
accountability drawbacks and “security vs liberty” tradeoffs. As such, Australian policymakers will need to
carefully consider the effectiveness, liabilities and limitations of current global intelligence networks and
associated political and institutional oversight mechanisms.
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Indeed, it can be argued that the internationalisation
of intelligence has spawned an “accountability deficit”
that has been exposed, in part, by the restricted utility of
informal agreements and off-the-record diplomatic arrangements. As such, this article will address and explore the
privacy and related risks that stem from the Australia–Israel
relationship as an example of how modern-day international security agencies cooperate in intelligence exchange.
Such governance frameworks (and normative standards)
remain primarily reinforced via memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and the constraints, or lack thereof,
that are directed by two key accountability mechanisms — the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) and the Inspector-General of
Intelligence and Security (IGIS).

Key takeaways
• Whilst the Australian intelligence agencies are
subject to privacy requirements that are informed
by the principles that underpin the Privacy Act, the
Privacy Act does not cover Australia’s intelligence
and national security agencies.
• Australia, like many western liberal democracies,
has a tendency to over-rely on the application of
non-enforceable diplomatic assurances in sensitive security matters, which might incorporate a
MOU as a subject-specific commitment between
two parties. But such arrangements do not create
or enforce legally binding obligations.
• Modern-day Israeli security linkages continue to
exist alongside notable concerns surrounding a
record of intelligence mismanagement and political maltreatment as well as a lack of appropriate
domestic oversight safeguards to effectively govern the nature of such covert global intelligence
enterprises.
• Australian policymakers need to carefully consider the effectiveness, liabilities and limitations of
current global intelligence networks and associated political and institutional oversight frameworks.
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• Australia’s key oversight and accountability mechanisms remain constrained, deficient and legislatively restricted in the area of international intelligence
cooperation.

Background
Australia and Israel formally established diplomatic
relations in 1949 though there is no formal public
acknowledgment of the origins of Australian–Israeli
intelligence relationship. Nonetheless, in more recent
years, the growing importance of defence and security
collaboration has seen a deliberate attentiveness at a
practical policy level. Moves towards enhancing mutual
support in the defence and intelligence realm can be seen
as picking up the pace due to factors like technological
communications advancements as well as the political
need to push back against threats like missile proliferation networks or transnational terrorism in a post-9/11
world.3
On the whole, international intelligence exchange
remains integral to both strategic calculations and the
operational work within intelligence services and connected government agencies. Various pieces of legislation, such as s 19 of the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979 (Cth), do allow for cooperation
with agencies and authorities of other countries approved
by the relevant minister. As such, enhancing intelligence
cooperation and respective surveillance systems — where
appropriate and when in compliance with privacy laws
and other regulations — should be seen as critical in
helping to provide decision-makers with tactical and
strategic warnings to better navigate global threat-based
ecosystems.
Yet there are real and potential hazards as well as
benefits in seeking such intelligence partnerships. In this
context, “good relations” with Israel are not an end in
themselves but should be seen as a means of securing
Australia’s national interests. Pointedly, a number of
past security and intelligence controversies have served
to spotlight the negative implications of excessive secrecy,
the precariousness of international norms and the problematic status of non-binding and informal security
protocols to direct preferred behaviour. Such past controversies have included the so-called passport affair in
which Israel had counterfeited four Australian passports
as part of an assassination plot as well as the circumstances surrounding the arrest and death of alleged agent
of Mossad, Benjamin Zygier.4
Taken as a whole, any situation acting to forge and
consolidate the conditions for the beneficial and constructive use of bilateral intelligence exchange should be
underwritten by appropriate governance mechanisms,
including oversight arrangements, which can provide
suitable guidance and transparency to pilot the purpose,
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nature and limits of such intelligence activities and
systems. Indeed, in past efforts to enhance collective
intelligence capabilities with other countries,
Hope J (who was most notably the appointed judge on a
series of Royal Commissions on Intelligence and Security in Australia during the 1970s and 1980s) had
observed:
But there are risks, and costs. There is a danger that some
of the information we are given access to will be deceptive
or misleading. Operational co-operation may entail some
loss of operational independence. Our agencies must beware
of seeming to be in the pockets of their powerful counterparts. Of course, they must avoid being so. Australia’s
national interest does not and cannot exactly or entirely
coincide with that of any other country, no matter how
friendly.5

Memorandums of understanding
Australia, like many western liberal democracies, has
a tendency to over-rely on the application of nonenforceable diplomatic assurances in sensitive security
matters, which might incorporate a MOU as a subjectspecific commitment between two parties (that will not
create legally binding obligations). A MOU is usually
used where it is considered preferable to avoid the
stricter regulations and procedures of an official treaty.
Unlike treaties, these types of informal diplomatic
agreements concerning the sharing of classified intelligence are typically kept confidential. Yet despite the fact
that little is usually known about the precise details of
these classified agreements, it had been revealed by
former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (DFAT) Dennis Richardson that in 2006 a
MOU had been entered into between an Australian and
an Israeli intelligence agency about protocols for use of
Australian passports.6 Given few countries will divulge
information on intelligence cooperation and its processes, this rare disclosure offered a distinctive window
to examine the logic and methods used to govern such
international exchanges and integrated safeguards.
Based on the Protective Security Policy Framework
(PSPF), the Australian Attorney-General’s Department
recommends that informal arrangements regarding security classified information are documented for a limited
time period and for an explicit purpose or activity.7
At the same time, the risks and costs in the search for
appropriate intelligence instructions and shared international practices will range from foreseeable to unpredictable. Despite some established rules such as the fact
that the NIC is not permitted to share information
branded AUSTEO (or Australian Eyes Only) with anyone who is not an Australian citizen, as captured by
Richelson, “while some risks are common to virtually
every intelligence cooperation arrangement, others may
be more difficult to anticipate”.8
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Other related quandaries might involve circumstances where anticipated benefits are contradictory,
free-riding behaviour, negative human rights implications like privacy breaches and the exposure to moral
hazards. A moral hazard is a situation in which one party
gets involved in a hazardous or precarious event knowing that it is protected against that risk and the other
party will incur the cost. Further, it is worth noting that
intelligence cooperation is fraught with polygonal problems and will continue to remain an intricate process
when dealing with multiparty liaison links such as, for
example, in dealing with the work of Mossad and its
counterparts in Washington DC.
For instance, the US National Security Agency (NSA),
in the dissemination of intelligence with Israel, has
included information about Australian citizens without
such sharing of information necessarily being consulted
on or agreed to by Australian authorities. In 2013,
another rare insight into the mishandling of the thirdparty rule was uncovered based on a leaked MOU by
whistleblower Edward Snowden. Previously classified
details had emerged of intelligence-sharing between the
NSA and its Israeli counterpart, the Israeli Signals
Intelligence National Unit (ISNU), on the sharing of
signals intelligence. The MOU between the NSA and the
ISNU had allowed NSA to share “raw SIGINT data”
with Israel. Details showed the US Government handed
over to Israel “raw” or “unevaluated and unminimised“
signals intelligence including “transcripts, gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and Digital Network Intelligence metadata
and content”.9
On the other hand, the MOU between Israel and US
had outlined:
ISNU . . . recognizes that NSA has agreements with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom that
require it to protect information associated with the UK
persons, Australian persons, Canadian persons and New
Zealand persons using procedures and safeguards similar to
those applied for US persons. For this reason, in all uses of
raw material provided by the NSA, ISNU agrees to apply
the procedures outlined in this agreement to persons of the
countries.10

So any mandate and protective features that were
provided within the above provisions were directly
undermined by the disclosure that Israel is also allowed
to receive “raw SIGINT data” — information that has
not been investigated and partitioned. Nor does it
indicate if the Australian intelligence agencies or the
other Five Eyes members mentioned had agreed or even
been consulted about the nature of the MOU between
the US and Israel. Typically, a receiving country is
intuitively likely to promise not to share information
onward to other countries without explicit permission;
however, this is again not without risks in a world of
mass digital surveillance and bulk interception. A major
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concern about the US sharing raw data with Israel is that
there are no legally binding limits on the use of the data
by the Israelis and that the information could even
theoretically be shared with other partners that are not
friendly towards, or inimical to, the interests of Australia.
In short, the leaked MOU draws attention to the
flawed nature of such entity-to-entity level and less
formal arrangements; arrangements that can act as an
obstacle to accountability as well as pose conceivable
dangers and blowback for Australian citizens’ privacy
and national interests.

Oversight and accountability mechanisms
So given the inherent risks and costs of foreign
intelligence liaisons, such as the Australia–Israel intelligence relationship, robust legislative oversight mechanisms do remain a core component of how to best
mitigate mistake, miscalculation or abuse given the
rapidly changing cross-border information flow structures. Of course, intelligence agencies will need to
maintain a degree of secrecy in both the collection and
operation realms and therefore the standards of accountability and oversight will unavoidably differ from those
applicable to other parts of government. At the same
time, the public needs to have confidence that those
intelligence agencies and their collaborative partners are
acting with legality, proportionality and efficiency.

Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence
and Security
Parliamentarians bear a responsibility for both developing the legal and the institutional framework for
oversight, and as the principal external overseers, for
ensuring that oversight accomplishes the central targets
of accountability and legitimacy. The PJCIS is constituted under s 28 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001
(Cth). However, the current piecemeal design of the
PJCIS stands on highly contestable grounds as the best
way of managing intelligence and security affairs that
will increasingly incorporate the blurring of lines between
domestic and foreign intelligence.
The PJCIS has a range of fundamental restrictions. Its
oversight mandate is primarily limited to overseeing the
administration and expenditure of NIC, addressing matters referred to it by the responsible minister or by a
resolution of parliament, and reporting its recommendations to parliament and the responsible minister. So
while the PJCIS might be powerful in the sense that it
can examine the NIC’s administration and expenditure,
it also is in effect hamstrung, as it cannot review the
intelligence-gathering and assessment priorities of the
NIC nor does it have the power to initiate its ownmotion inquiries into matters relating to the activities of
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an NIC agency. This would entail bilateral intelligence
and security sharing arrangements (with overseas partners like Israel).
In short, the functions of the PJCIS do not comprise
the ability to cover particular operations that have been
(or are being or are proposed to be) undertaken by the
NIC. As captured by Labor MP Anthony Byrne in 2019:
We need a committee that’s more independent, a committee
that does have remit into the operational activities of
intelligence and security services and the capacity to
initiate [its own] inquiries . . . it doesn’t have the powers it
needs to discharge [its] obligations on behalf of the
Parliament and the Australian people.11

Alternatively, a legislatively strengthened remit of
the PJCIS could be an important pathway of maintaining
better oversight as well as in building a base for wider
public confidence and assurance — especially given the
new demands of operational responsiveness in the search
for an even wider global network of security partners. As
a starting point, there does appear to be considerable
room for reform regarding the ambit, configuration and
operation of the PJCIS.

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security
Established by the Inspector-General of Intelligence
and Security Act 1986 (Cth), the role and functions of
the IGIS do remain a highly valuable component of the
overall oversight infrastructure imposed on the NIC. In
many ways, the Inspector-General’s review and oversight of operational activities does supplement approaches
and attitudes within the PJCIS.
The IGIS is an independent executive oversight body
whose legislative task does enable it to provide assurances that the NIC is acting with legality, propriety,
under ministerial direction and with consistency in
regard to human rights standards. The IGIS has significant powers, akin to those of a Royal Commission,
which can include the ability to review information and
require persons to answer questions and produce documents. It can also investigate complaints and undertake
regular inspections of agency files and documentation to
identify potential problems with compliance and control
frameworks within agencies.
However, what is less apparent is whether the IGIS
has the ability or the resources to oversee international
intelligence-sharing agreements, like those between Australia and Israel. In fact, there are very few mechanisms
at either national or international levels that have the
ability to deal with and regulate the intricate or multilayered
cross-jurisdictional aspects of intelligence cooperation
in any detail.
The main role of IGIS is to oversee the activities of
the intelligence agencies as opposed to why they should
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be conducting these activities. This is an important
distinction. At the same time, extending the remit and
resourcing of the IGIS commensurate to match with the
scale and complexity of the entire NIC would help to
support its oversight objectives related to issues of
legality and propriety. And other current human rights
and related debate points associated to the extended
powers of the NIC — including access to, and sharing
of, citizen data — are likely to only intensify the
workload for the IGIS.

Conclusion
The formation of intelligence agreements such as the
Australia–Israel should always be predicated on the
careful assessment and management of the risks, including privacy, associated with it. Any situation of fashioning executive agreements to underpin intelligence coalitions
should be underwritten by a plurality of appropriate
governance mechanisms, including strong institutional
and legislative oversight arrangements which can provide guidance and transparency to ensure compliance
and quality control. Legislative oversight bodies should
be equipped to support the integrity and reputation of
intelligence processes as well as investigate allegations
of wrongdoing linked to international intelligence cooperation.
The use of diplomatic assurances is principally based
on a notion of trust that the receiving state will uphold
particular moral obligations and standards of behaviour.
However, the practices of informal agreements, while
proving some level of behavioural check, have proven to
be highly fragile and can be undoubtedly circumvented.
In this sense, robust formal oversight systems and the
advance of legally constrained intelligence parties that
are shaped towards respecting personal information and
human rights could help to counter human rights and
related concerns while assisting to avert future political
flash points and diplomatic clashes.
The effective oversight of the intelligence agencies
will require a strengthening of the PJCIS’ legislative
powers to widen its remit to include an ability to
consider and investigate operations matters as well as
conduct its own independent inquiries. Further, the IGIS,
an independent statutory officeholder, should be allowed
to oversee intelligence matters that might extend to
involve other government departments, such as DFAT.
The sharing of information is ultimately a balance of
interests. Australian citizens should expect that the
actions of their intelligence and security agencies are
properly scrutinised and held to account while items like
privacy, rights and liberties, and rule of law do remain
fundamental democratic and legal principles.
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